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The Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and USA:  







In order to assess the impact of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Colombia and 
the United States of America, we describe the characteristics of the Colombian economy 
emphasizing its trade patterns and perspectives and identifying the sectors and regions 
that are likely to be the most sensitive to a FTA. We argue that the effects of a bilateral 
trade agreement between the USA and Colombia would be similar to those of past trade 
reforms.  We first analyze the effect of past reforms over a diverse sample of countries 
such as Chile, Colombia and Mexico and then, using an applied general equilibrium 
model, simulate the effects over the Colombian economy of a bilateral agreement with 
USA.  The simulations show that, although small, there is an increase in welfare and 





Colombia will face a major challenge in international trade when,  in the medium term, 
countries of the American continent form the biggest free trade area in the world. Currently, 
Colombia is about to take an important step in this direction signing a bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the USA. In this paper we, first, identify the most important effects 
that this FTA is likely to produce on the Colombian economy and then we propose a series 
of actions that have the potential to reinforce the positive impact of a FTA while 
smoothening the effect on poverty and income distribution. 
 
In order to assess the impact of a FTA we first review the experiences of both Colombia 
and Mexico with the trade liberalization of the 90’s and NAFTA, respectively.  Second, we 
use a Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) calibrated for Colombia and simulate 
the possible consequences of different trade policies. 
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We describe the characteristics of the Colombian economy emphasizing its trade patterns 
and perspectives and identifying the sectors that are likely to be the most sensitive to a 
FTA. We argue that the effects of a bilateral trade agreement between USA and Colombia 
would be similar to the effects of past trade reforms undertaken in Colombia. 
 
With regard to the effect of free trade reforms on income distribution, a common finding in 
the empirical literature
1 is that skill premiums increased in roughly the same percentage 
across industries, that the proportion of skilled workers rose in every industry and that the 
sectors that experienced larger tariff reductions and increased imports competition 
experienced a rise in informal employment. However, the effect that trade reforms had on 
Colombian wage distribution is small compared with what happened in Mexico. We 
suggest as a possible explanation for this difference the behavior of FDI in the two 
countries. 
 
We also review the experience of Mexico and Chile and try to derive some lessons for 
Colombia. We observe that the economic performance of Mexico was outstanding after 
NAFTA and Chile also performed very well after its trade reforms. In both countries the 
average wages increased and the gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP was 
significantly higher than in Colombia for the last decade. For the case of Mexico some 
effects on income distribution deserve special attention: (i) Differences in income across 
geographical regions grew. In particular, Mexico City and the areas close to the United 
States were benefited the most. (ii) The skill premium grew dramatically. (iii) 
Manufacturing was by far the winning sector, while agriculture is perceived as a loser. 
 
Based on the experience of Mexico and Chile and supported by the simulations, we claim 
that the effect of a free trade agreement between Colombia and United States will be small 
but positive for the Colombian economy as a whole. However, to guarantee that the 
benefits derived from such an agreement can spread to different geographical regions and 
different economic sectors, Colombian government must undertake several measures:   (i) 
integrate all the regions of the country in economic unity. This implies the construction and 
                                                 
1 See for Example Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003.   3
improvement of transportation infrastructure; (ii) increase the share of skilled workers in 
labor supply. This implies better efficiency and more government spending on education; 
and (iii) it must be clear what kind of productive structure is beneficial for the Colombian 
society. In particular, since the agreement can affect negatively part of the agricultural 
sector, it must be clear if the government should or should not negotiate special clauses for 
it. In order to answer this question, a detailed study on the agricultural sector is necessary, 
evaluating its efficiency, demand for labor and importance for the economy as a whole. 
 
II. What happened with the reforms of the 90’s? 
 
The assessment of the impact of the Colombian 1990’s economic reforms is a hard task, 
considering the broad scope of the policies implemented. We evaluate three main variables: 
trade performance, income distribution and economic growth
2. 
 
In the late 80’s, Colombia began a major trade reform. The reform was accompanied by 
modifications of the labor regime in order to reduce labor rigidities and some reforms in the 
financial system to enhance resources mobility. More than a decade after the trade reform 
began it is possible to describe the behavior of the main variables of the economy and try to 
derive some lessons from the recent history. 
 
Table 1 
Colombian Trade Policy 
 1985  1990 1995 1999
Trade Policy Index  0.21  0.41 0.52 0.56
Average  Import  Tariff  83 23 13 12 
Import Tariff Dispersion  28  14  5  6 
Source: Lora (2001) 
 
Table 1 shows two dimensions of the trade reforms. Row 2 shows the average import tariff 
and row 3 the import tariff dispersion
3. The Trade Policy Index is a calculation made by 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive evaluation of the reform see IADB(2004 and 1997).   4
Lora (2001) which considers these two dimensions. It seems that the process of 
liberalization took two important steps, one between 1985 and 1990 and the other between 
1990 and 1995. After 1995 there has been a small reduction in average tariffs and a small 
increase in tariff dispersion. 
 
The first result to highlight is the effect that the reforms had on imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP. Figure 1 presents the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. 
The rise of this share between 1983 and 1990 -consistent with the first liberalization step- 
was more than 15 points as a share of GDP. However, when we take average values before 
and after the reforms, the rise of the share is between 5% and 10% of GDP. Today, 
international trade is about 40% of Colombian GDP, substantially lower than in countries 
like Mexico and Chile (both around 60%). 
 
Figure 1  
 
Source: DANE and authors Calculations 
 
Thus, although the reforms had an effect on the share of international trade, such an effect 
has been relatively small.  Among the possible explanations for this fact we can find the 
following arguments: 
                                                                                                                                                     
3 The import tariff dispersion indicate the variance in tariffs among different goods. 
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1.  The geographical characteristics of Colombia constitute a natural protection against 
international trade, at least when compared with Mexico and Chile. Indeed, Colombia 
does not have the proximity to the USA that Mexico enjoys. Similarly, the average 
distance from the sea is substantially higher in Colombia than it is in Chile. 
2.  The initial import tariffs were higher in Colombia than in Chile and Mexico and the 
average import tariff is still higher in Colombia (see table 2). 
3.  The poor performance of the Venezuelan economy, one of the main trade partners of 
Colombia, has harmed the process of internationalization of the economy (see figures 2 
and 2a). 
4.  The lag in transportation infrastructure increases the costs of international trade (see 
tables 3 and 3a). 
 
From table 2, it seems that the difference in import tariffs is not main cause of the “trade 
gap”. Thus, the openness of the economy may depend also on the Colombian government’s 
effort to improve the transportation infrastructure and also on the recovery of the 
Venezuelan economy. In other words, the effect of a FTA alone is likely to be relatively 
small. 
 

























 Source: DANE 
 
Table 2 
Average Import Tariff  Trade Policy Index   
1985 1990  1999 1985 1990  1999 
Colombia  46.4 23.0  11.8  0.29 0.41  0.56 
Chile    36.0 14.9  10.6  0.49 0.57  0.61 
México  34.0 13.1  10.1  0.29 0.42  0.51 










Chile 0  3  3.76 
Colombia 0.5  7  2.26 
México 0.5  4  3.34 
Source: Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004). 
*Zero means no restrictions,  0.25 minor restrictions, 0.5 if a joint venture is condition is  imposed, 0.75 if a 
very high national participation in the company is required and 1 if foreign companies are simply forbidden to 
provide cargo handling services.  
** Taken from Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004). 













 Chile México Colombia
Kilometers of roads per million citizens  860  900  350 
Source: Federación Colombiana de Transportadores de Carga por Carretera. 
 
After a short appraisal of the evolution of international trade, the next step is to identify 
trade openness reform’s “winners” and “losers”; that is, which sectors were benefited from 
the tariff reduction and which sectors were harmed. Table 4 present exports composition in 
2000. In Table 5 we calculate the growth rate of exports in dollars for the eighties and 
nineties. Finally, in Table 6 we do the same exercise for imports. 
 
Table 4 
Colombia: Exports Composition (2000) 
Coffee 6.22%









Colombia: Exports Growth 










Other agricultural goods  1.41% -15.70%
Manufacturing 6.04% 18.77%
Chemicals 9.17% 33.28%
Textiles and leather  8.78% 11.16%
Food 1.66% 19.52%
Machinery and equipment  1.79% 25.70%
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Table 6 
Colombia: Imports Growth by Sector (average rate) 
Imports Growth by Sector (average rate)  76-86  86-96 
Agriculture 26.10% 30.18%
Fishing and Hunting  21.82% 74.68%
Meats 27.41% 23.36%
Processed Cereals  29.88% 50.09%
Dairies 15.73% 26.44%
Sugar   115.70%
Processed Tobacco  -1.16% 28.06%
Other processed agricultural goods  20.11% 28.04%
Wood and furniture  29.57% 49.57%
Chemicals 30.61% 27.08%
Machinery and equipment  28.31% 32.41%
Transports 21.85% 37.75%
Services 23.34% 45.06%
Commerce and recovery products  34.35% 92.00%
Communications 41.60% 21.55%
Services for firms  18.36% 55.90%




Manufacturing has been one of the big winners from trade liberalization. In particular, 
Chemical Products, Machinery and Equipment and Basic Metals have experienced an 
important increase in export activity. Among the losers Coffee, Gold and other agricultural 
products present an important reduction in exports. Regarding imports, Sugar, Commerce, 
Fishing and Hunting and Wood presented the most rapid acceleration in imports after the 
trade reforms (see Table 6). Thus, trade liberalization reform and regional integration have 
had a positive impact over the countries manufacturing exports performance. In the future, 
as will be shown in the simulation below, it is likely that the effects that past trade reforms 
had on each sector will get stronger if a bilateral trade agreement between USA and 
Colombia takes place.  
 
While the evidence supports the idea that the reforms of the 90’s generated an increase in 
efficiency (see Fernandes, 2002 and Eslava et.al, 2004), there is some concern about the 
effect that trade had on income inequality and that on the prospect of a bilateral agreement 
would exacerbate the problem of inequality.  
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A standard measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. Figure 3 presents the evolution of 
this coefficient for labor income between 1983 and 2001. This data shows that the 1990’s 
witnessed an expansion in income inequality. Although a complete account of this result 
has to be studied, the deterioration of income distribution can be related to two main 
factors: the unequal performance among economic sectors and the increase in wage 
premiums. 
 
As it shown in figure 4, average real wages presented positive growth for the majority of 
sectors between 1988 and 2001. However, the growth rates were not equal for all the 
sectors and it was negative for some of them. In particular real wages in the commercial 
sector decreased, perhaps as a consequence of the big increase of imports in the sector (see 
table 6). 
 




The issue of skill premiums was addressed in a systematic way by Attanasio, Goldberg and 
Pavnic (2003). These authors use data obtained from DANE, DNP and the United Nations 








































1.  Trade reform positively affected wage premiums. 
2.  Changes in skill premiums are roughly the same across industries. 
3.  There is no evidence of reallocation of labor. This result is consistent with the 
differences in real wages growth rates among sectors. 
4.  The proportion of skilled workers rose in every industry, suggesting that during the 
90’s many of the firms in Colombia undertook skill-biased technological changes. 
5.  The sectors that experienced larger tariff reductions and an increase in imports saw 
a rise in informal employment. 
6.  The effect that trade reforms had on Colombian wage distribution is small compared 
with what happened in Mexico (see Gordon, 2003). A possible explanation for this 
difference is the behavior of FDI in the two countries. 
 
Until now we have assessed the distributive effects of the reforms but we have not 
identified the effects for the Colombian economy as a whole. Were the reforms good in the 
aggregate? Should the current government undertake further reforms in the same direction? 
In figure 5 we can see the behavior of GDP growth and inflation during the last decade of 
20
th century. In terms of inflation the decade was a complete success. However, economic 
growth was not consistently high. Indeed, the first years of the decade were characterized 
by an acceleration of economic growth, but after 1995 the growth was reduced until 1999, 
when the economy suffered its worst recession in the last 60 years. 
 
Even though the recession may be related the changes in trade policy, its cause may be 
found in the management of fiscal policy. Indeed, a new constitution signed in 1991 
imposed increasing spending obligations on the Colombian government. Consequently,   
public expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from 20% in 1990 to 28% in 1995 and 
finally to 36% in 1999. The upsurge of public expenditure led to an appreciation of the peso 
that, together with the reduction in tariffs, generated a huge commercial deficit. The 
macroeconomic situation of the early 90´s led individuals to increase consumption, thereby 
increasing tax revenue and balancing the fiscal budget for some years. However, the 
continuous growth in public expenditure generated a growing fiscal deficit in the late 90´s.    11
Finally, the persistence of fiscal and commercial deficits, together with the crisis in other 
Latin-American countries, caused a interruption of capital inflows and a currency crisis. 
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Source: DNP and Banco de la República 
 
Thus, it is not possible to blame the crisis on the tariff reductions alone. A mixture of bad 
economic policy and bad luck are to blame. In spite of these factors, a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects that the reforms may have on long run economic growth must look at 
incentives to invest. Four factors suggest that the reforms succeeded in increasing the 
incentives to accumulate both human and physical capital: 
(i) The rise in skill premium reflects an increase in incentives to invest in human capital. 
(ii) Increasing foreign investment (see figure 6) shows that investment in physical capital 
became much more productive after the reforms.
4  
(iii) According to Fernandes (2002) a 10 percent-point drop in Colombia’s ad-valorem 
tariff translates into a 3-percent increase in manufacturing productivity. 
                                                 
4 Another interpretation is that privatizations attracted foreign investment. Therefore public profitable firms 
became private and the new owners were not Colombians. However, the empirical relevance of this 
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(iv) According to Eslava et. al. (2004), “market reforms are associated with rising overall 




III. Colombian Trade Patterns 
 
Comparing the growth rates of exports before and after the reforms give us an idea of their 
effect on the trade direction. Table 7 shows the share of exports by geographic zone in 2001 
and the growth rate of exports between 1980 and 1990, before the reforms, and between 
1990 and 2001, after the reforms. The USA appears to be the main buyer of Colombian 
goods, followed by Venezuela, the nearest neighbor. The European Union, as a whole, is in 
the third place. The reforms and the trade agreements favored exports to Latin America 
and, in particular, to the Andean Group; exports to the USA were not affected; and, clearly, 
exports to the European Union decreased. 
 
Table 7 
Colombia: Share of Exports by Geographic Zone. 
2001 Growth 80-90 Growth 90-2001
Developed Countries  60.32% -2.93% -20.27%
   USA  42.72% 54.63% 3.46%
   European Union   13.90% -34.01% -50.92%
Latin-America 36.40% -1.72% 109.13%
Andean Group  22.44% -43.96% 307.22%
   Venezuela  14.14% -57.46% 369.78%
   Peru  2.26% 78.29% 70.97%
   Ecuador  5.70% -43.80% 417.16%
MERCOSUR 1.78% -45.35% 62.53%
   Brazil  1.36% 94.60% 205.76%
Rest of Latin-America  12.18% 83.93% 12.80%
   México  2.13% 19.94% 251.95%
   Chile  1.37% 48.72% -43.59%
Source: DANE 
 
Table 8 shows the share of non-traditional exports (excluding oil and coffee) by geographic 
zone. The effects of reforms and trade agreements were strong. Exports to the countries 
with which Colombia signed trade agreements (Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico) grew 
substantially more in the 90’s than in the previous decades. 
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Table 8 
Share of Non-traditional Exports by 
Geographic Zone 
 1980  1990  2000 
   USA  27.7%  36.0%  31.6%
   European Union  17.2%  17.2%  9.8% 
   Japan  4.2%  5.0%  1.1% 
Latin-America 43.0%  33.8%  51.2%
Andean Group  26.0%  11.8%  31.4%
   Venezuela  18.7%  6.2%  20.1%
   Peru  2.0%  2.7%  3.7% 
   Ecuador  5.2%  2.7%  7.0% 
Mercosur 1.6%  1.4%  3.2% 





Colombia: Share of Imports by 
Geographic Zone 
1997 Growth  90-97
USA 41.53%  17.26%
European Union  15.77%  -24.03%
Japan 4.21%  -52.55%
Canada 2.39%  -32.02%
Venezuela 9.99%  73.74%
Peru 1.03%  -42.62%
Ecuador 2.58%  216.87%
Bolivia 0.37%  230.37%
Argentina 0.75%  -69.19%
Brazil 2.81%  -15.80%
Mexico 3.51%  66.85%
Source: DANE 
Table 9 shows the share of imports by geographic zone in 1997 and the growth rate of 
imports between 1990 and 1997. The USA appears as the main source of Colombian 
imports, followed by the European Union and Venezuela. Looking at growth rates of 
imports it seems that the reforms and the trade agreements favored imports from the 
Andean Group, with the exception of Peru, and also from Mexico; imports from the USA 
grew but in a more moderate way; and, imports from Canada, Mercosur and the European 
Union decreased.  
 
From tables 7, 8 and 9 two main facts stand out: the USA is the main trade partner of 
Colombia and the trade agreements signed with the Andean countries have had a strong 
effect on trade flows. Therefore, it is likely that a bilateral free trade agreement between the 
USA and Colombia will have significant effects on the quantity of trade flows and on the 
composition of Colombian trade. But in terms of the trade balance, what are the most 
vulnerable sectors? 
 
Table 10  
Colombian Trade Balance by Geographic Zones (Millions of Dollars) 
  Total USA European Union JapanLatin-AmericaAndean Group Mercosur Mexico Chile
1991 2447.34 857.20 992.33 -196.19 857.66 320.65 -213.81 -99.61 108.29
1995 -2642.3 -1176.5 135.2 -667.6 -269.0 286.2 -513.5 -363.3 -45.1
2003 -64.5 1556.9 -155.1 -362.1 245.0 269.3 -740.3 -276.7 -76.2
Source: DANE 
   15
The decrease in imports from Europe, Japan and Canada also stand out. Even though a 
complete explanation for this fact goes beyond the aim of this paper, in future research it 
would be interesting to explore whether, in an era of economic blocks the absence of 
agreements between these countries and Colombia led to trade deviation. 
 
Table 10 shows the trade balance between Colombia and a group of countries for the years 
1991, 1995 and 2003. The balance with some regions is persistently negative while with 
others it is persistently positive. However, the bilateral flow of goods and services between 
the USA and Colombia seems to be more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions and, for 
this reason, is positive for some years and negative for others.  
 
Table 11 shows imports from the USA by sector. Almost half of the imports coming from 
the USA are Metals, Machinery and Equipment. This fact, together with the current level of 
tariffs (see the appendix) suggests that a bilateral trade agreement would reduce the cost of 




Share of Imports from USA 
 2001 
Metals, Machinery and Equipment  44.5% 
Chemical Products  26.5% 
Food, Beverage and tobacco  6.5% 
Agriculture and hunting  5.2% 
Textiles, clothing and leather  5.8% 
Basic Metals  4.4% 




Thus, in principle, a bilateral trade agreement between Colombia and USA would not have 
negative consequences for the trade balance
6 and it may reduce the cost of capital goods in 
Colombia. However, the production in some sectors could be negatively affected by the 
                                                 
5 The current government has implemented a policy of zero tariffs for imports of goods relate with investment 
enhancement.  
6 By a trade agreement we mean a bilateral reduction (or elimination) of import tariffs. Off course if the 
reduction of import tariffs is not bilateral the effects are different.   16
agreement. In particular, Food, Beverage and tobacco; Textiles, clothing and leather; 
Agriculture and hunting; and Paper and editorial products are vulnerable sectors. 
 
IV. What can we expect?  
 
In the previous sections we reviewed the recent Colombian trade data in an effort to 
forecast the possible consequences of a bilateral free trade agreement between the USA and 
Colombia. In this chapter we try to derive some lessons from the Mexican experience after 
signing a trade agreement with the USA and Canada. We also review the experience of 
Chile because among Latin-American countries it has been the most liberal economy in 
terms of international trade
7. 
 




NAFTA is an agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico that was signed in 
December 1992 and implemented on January 1, 1994.  NAFTA represents one the most 
important economic achievements for Mexico (Barclays Capital Research, Emerging 
Markets Drivers, January 9, 2004). The agreement turned Mexico into an export growth 
story without precedents. Exports quadrupled in 10 years, increasing from USD 40 billion 
in 1990 to USD 165 billion in 2000. Total exports and imports rose to USD 337 billions, or 
55% of Mexico’s GDP, compared with only USD 64 billion in 1990. As a result, Mexico 
replaced Japan as the second largest trading partner of the USA until 2003, when it was in 
turn replaced by China. NAFTA also helped diversify Mexico’s economy and therefore 
reduced its dependence on oil. Oil exports were 80% of total exports in the early 1980s, but 
fell to a low of about 7% of total exports in 2000, although since then they have risen to 
11.3% in 2003, owing to an overvalued exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
7 See The Index of Economic Freedom, computed by the Heritage Foundation for 161 countries since 1995.    17
For these reasons, Mexico became an attractive investment opportunity for the USA 
multinational companies during the second half of the 1990s. NAFTA raised attractive 
investment opportunities in Mexico and ushered in an important economic achievement 
period, turning Mexico into an export-led growth story. While foreign direct investment 
remains low, it improved dramatically, thanks to NAFTA, reaching an average USD 10 
billion in recent years, compared with only USD 2.6 billion  in 1990. Moreover, Mexico 
alone accounts for about two-thirds of the foreign direct investment to Latin America. 
 
Economic growth was the greatest achievement of Mexico’s during this period. Following 
the 1994-95 crisis, growth averaged 5% from 1998-2000, as NAFTA successfully 
integrated Mexico’s business cycle into that of the United States.  
 
Table 12 
Mexico Exports and Imports composition by sector (2002).  
 Exports Imports
Agriculture 2.10% 2.89%
Stock, agriculture, hunting and fishing  0.36% 0.30%





Mexico, Exports and Imports 2001    
  Exports Imports
Latin-American Association for Integration (ALADI)  1.91% 2.82%
Colombia 0.32% 0.20%
Centro-American Common Market (MCC)  0.91% 0.21%
Rest of Latin-America  0.44% 0.04%
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM)  0.15% 0.03%
Canada 1.94% 2.51%
United States of America  88.67% 67.73%
European Union  3.37% 9.69%
China  (Taiwan)  0.11% 1.79%
Asia (without Middle East)  1.21% 12.96%
China (Beijing)  0.18% 2.39%
Japan 0.39% 4.80%
Source: INEGI 
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Finally, to have an idea of the effects of NAFTA on different sectors and on trade with 
different countries, tables 12 and 13 present the composition of Mexico’s sectoral 
international trade and trade partners.  From table 12 it follows that the most active sector 
in terms of international trade is manufacturing. Therefore, if the predictions of trade theory 
are right, we should observe productivity gains in this sector.  
 
With regard to the trade destination, USA is definitively the main commercial partner of 
Mexico. However, the country is more important as a market for exports than as a source of 
imports. Therefore, it seems that the effects of NATFA were bigger opening markets for 
Mexican products than introducing competing products from the rest of North America. 





The integration of Mexico into the North American economy has had profound 
consequences for the Mexican labor market. According to the classical theory of trade, free 
trade is supposed to equalize the prices of tradable goods and prices of factors. However, 
the differences between Mexico and the rest of North America are not limited to factor 
abundance. It seems that technologies are different. In particular, total factor productivity 
appears to be higher in the United States than in Mexico.   
 
Besides free trade, NAFTA generated an increase in capital flows from the USA to Mexico 
and labor flows from Mexico to USA. These two forces make relative factor supply less 
different than before the agreement. However, in spite of NAFTA, North American labor 
market integration has a long way to go. Wages in USA are still substantially higher than 
those in Mexico. This can be related to barriers to factor flows that limit migration on the 
part of USA and discourage investment on the part of Mexico. 
 
In any case, NAFTA has had clear effects on the Mexican labor market. The literature on 
the impact of Mexico’s policy reforms on wages underlines the following effects (see 
Gordon, 2003):   19
(i)  Increase in average wages. 
(ii)  Increase in wages volatility. 
(iii)  A substantial increase in the return to skills leading to an increase in wage 
inequality. 
(iv)  Wages in states on the Mexico-USA border have increased relative to wages in 
the rest of the country. 
 
The increase in average wages is one of the expected results of NAFTA. However, as we 
mentioned above, wages in USA are still higher than in Mexico and the gap does not seem 
to be shrinking. So the effect of labor market integration on average wages was not 
significant. 
 
The reduction of barriers to trade and foreign investment has led to an increase in the 
demand for skilled labor in Mexico and, as a result, the returns to education experienced a 
substantial increase. Increases in returns to education during the 90’s were nationwide and 
followed increases in returns to education in the USA (see Gordon, 2003).  Partial labor-
market integration helps to explain this effect. Foreign direct investment plus skill biased 
technological innovations (may be imported) can explain the rest of the story. 
 
Finally, the fact that wages grew more in regions with higher FDI, higher rates of migration 
to the USA and higher exposure to trade indicate that the integration of the Mexican 
economy with the rest of North America was helpful to workers in the regions where such 
integration occurred. In other words, only a part of Mexico enjoyed the benefits of NAFTA 




One of the main reasons why economists are in favor of free trade is because specialization 
is usually accompanied by an efficient allocation of factors and, in this way, it increases 
productivity. In the case of Mexico, the behavior of total factor productivity (TFP) prior to 
NAFTA was definitively poor and a motivation for becoming part of the commercial bloc. 
Mexico’s overall TFP performance was disappointing since the early 80’s to the mid 90’s   20
(between minus 1 and minus 2 percent) and free trade was a tough way to restart economic 
growth. 
 
After eight years of the agreement, Fernando Lopez Cordova (2003) presented a serious 
study trying to identify the effects of NAFTA on manufacturing productivity. Four effects 
deserve to be highlighted: 
 
1. Industries that compete with North American imports saw a productivity jump by 13% 
from 1993 to 1999. 
2. Exporting Industries experienced a productivity growth of 4% during the same period. 
3. Industries without links to foreign trade or foreign investment experienced a TFP growth 
of 1%. 
4. The increase in preferences granted to Mexican goods increase the level of productivity 
but not its growth rate. 
 
Therefore, the effects of NAFTA on manufacturing productivity were positive and 
important; increasing competition was more important than increasing access to the North 
American market and only the industries that were affected by the agreement experienced 




As was indicated above, manufactured products have been a successful example of the 
positive effect of NAFTA. Agriculture, however, is described as a complete disaster by 
some journalists and farmers. In this section we review the available data with some detail 
in order to present an overview of the performance of the sector and try to distinguish the 
effects of NAFTA from the structural problems of Mexican agriculture. 
 
Mexico’s agriculture was NAFTA’s most protected sector from the beginning. Indeed, 88% 
of the agricultural exports gained immediate tariff-free access to USA and 61% to Canada 
while the share of tariff-free Mexico’s imports from USA was 36% and from Canada was 
41%. Mexico eliminated tariffs on 42% of imports from USA over a ten-year period ending   21
in 2003 and 18% will continue to have positive tariffs until 2008. In contrasts 100% of 




Even though Mexico’s agriculture is the most protected sector within North America, 
Mexico belongs to the World Trade Organization and, in order to fulfill the signed 
treatments, must give tariff free access to imports of certain goods. In particular, only 38% 
of Mexico’s agricultural imports are tariff-free because of NAFTA. 
 
Agricultural exports have benefited from Mexico’s trade opening. In 1986, when Mexico 
joined GATT, agricultural exports were stagnant.  From 1986 to 1993, exports rose by 5% 
a year. With NAFTA, between 1994 and 2001, the growth rate of agricultural export was 
12% on average. Imports have also increased. From 1986 to 1993, imports rose by 23% a 




Within agriculture, fruits and vegetables have been a success during NAFTA. Exports of 
Mexican fruits and vegetables to USA rose by 118% from 1993 to 2001 from US$1.38 
billion to US$3.02 billion. The other side of the story is the behavior of the meat producing 
sector. Beef has been one of the most negatively affected products. The liberalization of the 
beef market started in 1989 when import tariffs were eliminated in order to compensate 
domestic scarcity with imports. From 1993 to 2001, imports of beef rose from 4% to 21% 
of domestic production while local production grew 1.6% a year. Similarly, pork-meat 
imports increased from 5.8% to 17.9% of domestic production between 1993 and 2001 
while domestic production grew 4.2% a year. 
At first sight it seems that NAFTA has damaged the meat producing sector. However, one 
reason for the increase in agricultural imports is the fact that per capita consumption of 
animal-protein food has grown rapidly in recent years. From 1990 to 2001 per capita 
                                                 
8 Moreover, Mexico has adopted a protection scheme similar to that used in USA, i.e., Mexico has been 
providing direct subsidies to some portion of their farmers.  
9 “La política de Comercio Exterior de México en el Sector Agroalimentario” José Rodolfo Arias Arizpe, 
Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, México, Noviembre 2002.   22
consumption of beef rose from 12.3 to 16.4 kilograms and consumption of pork meat grew 
from 11.2 to 14 kilograms
10.  
In summary, although Mexican agriculture performance has not been outstanding since the 
beginning of NAFTA, free trade is helping an efficient reallocation of resources in rural 
areas.  Similarly, the evolution of per capita consumption of animal-protein food indicates 
that free trade had succeeded increasing consumer’s welfare. These results are consistent 
with the expected effects of a free trade agreement. 
 
Trade is not enough: Chile and Mexico 
 
The economic performance of Chile and Mexico has been clearly better than that of 
Colombia since the late 80’s (see figure 7).  However, the excellent economic performance 
in Chile has been persistent while the growth path of Mexico has been irregular. If we take 
a close look to figure 7 it appears that the per capita GDP gap between Colombia and 
Mexico has been roughly constant between 1985 and 1993; between 1994 and 1995 the gap 
was reduced, growing after 1995. Even though international trade cannot account for the 
whole story, it is evident that the trade reforms in Chile and NAFTA help to explain the 
differences among the three countries. 
 
As indicated above, the economic performance of Mexico was outstanding after NAFTA 
and Chile also performed very well after its trade reforms. In both countries the average 
wages increased and the gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP was significantly 
higher than in Colombia for the last decade (see figures 8, 9 and 10). 
 
However, the economic growth experience of Mexico and Chile has been completely 
different in the last two decades of the 20
th century, even when considering that both 
countries experienced profound economic crises in the early 80’s, the recovery paths were 
different. Indeed, Chile recovered its economic growth trend in less than a decade and, 
                                                 
10 A similar story can be told about chicken and eggs.   23
since then, its economic growth rate has been higher than before the crisis. In contrast, 
Mexico couldn’t achieve positive per capita growth rates until the late 90’s. 
 
Figure 7 
Source: World Bank 
 
The economic literature provides three possible explanations for the differences in 
economic performance
11: (i) Real wages behavior. According to this explanation, the 
Chilean government revised its wage indexation policy and allowed real wages to fall. This 
view argues that this policy, together with policies that produced a rapid depreciation of the 
real exchange rate, generated an export boom that helped the rapid recovery. (ii) The effect 
of external debt on the investment climate. According to this hypothesis, new investors 
were discouraged from investing in Mexico, fearing that most of the returns would be taxed 
to pay off old loans. (iii) Structural Reforms. According to this point of view, the main 
difference can be found in the way in which the two countries addressed structural reforms 
such as fiscal policy, privatizations, trade and banking sector.  
 
Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe and Soto (BKKS) present a broad study, reviewing all the 
possible explanations. For them, the different economic performance of Mexico and Chile 
after the 1980’s crisis is explained by differences in TFP growth. Productivity showed 
                                                 
11 See for example Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe and Soto (2001); Glade (1996); Hachette and Luders (1993); De 













different growth paths because Chile undertook important reforms in the banking system 
and bankruptcy laws that Mexico did not.  
 
For BKKS, the most important factor was Chilean willingness to pay the costs of reforming 
the banking system and letting inefficient firms go bankrupt. This fact explains the higher 
Chilean domestic credit as a percentage of GDP since the 80’s compared to that observed in 
Mexico for the same period (see figure 11). In second place, Chile reaped the benefits of 
reforms in privatization during the 80’s while Mexico was just beginning to implement 
them. Similarly, openness to foreign direct investment and deregulation in domestic 
industry occurred first in Chile. 
 
Additionally, there are at least three indicators that score higher in Chile than in Mexico 
and Colombia. The first one is education; Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the adult illiteracy 
rate and tertiary school enrollment respectively. The illiteracy rate of Mexico has been 
consistently twice as much of that shown in Chile. In 2000 the Mexican illiteracy rate is 
close to eight percent, the illiteracy rate of Chile in 1980. Second, since the 80’s the tertiary 
school enrollment has grown continuously in Chile while in Mexico it has been roughly 
constant. 
 
A third difference can be found in the technology available in each country. Figures 14 and 
15 show the penetration of personal computers and mobile phones in Chile, Mexico and 
Colombia. Small differences in the beginning of the 90’s have grown to become substantial 
in the years 2000 and 2001.  As expected, Chile managed to rapidly increase the number of 
mobile phones and personal computers, mainly since the mid 90’s; Mexico, while behind 
Chile, is doing much better than Colombia. 
 
Another relevant difference is the transportation infrastructure. In the second section on the 
paper we showed the indices of Port Efficiency and kilometers of roads per million citizens. 
It seems that Chile has better ports than Mexico and Colombia, and Mexico has better ports 
than Colombia. However, with regard to roads, Mexico is slightly better that Chile.  In any   25
case, the lag of Colombia is striking;  the roads should be multiplied by a factor of 2.5 to 
have a road network as good as the Mexican. 
 
Finally, according to Caballero, Engel and Micco, 2004 microeconomic flexibility is higher 
in Chile and Colombia than it is in Mexico, meaning that the response at the firm level to 
changes in the economic environment is faster in the first two countries. 
 
 
Figure 8. Real Wage in Mexico. 1988-2003 
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Figure 9. Chile. Real Wages. 1988-2000 
Source:  Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe and Soto (2001) 
 
Figure 10 
Source: World Bank 
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Figure 11 
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VI. Simulating the FTA 
 
In the previous sections we reviewed the recent economic history of Colombia, Mexico and  
Chile to derive some lessons for the future. In this section we simulate the possible 
consequences of a FTA between USA and Colombia using a multiregional Computable 
General Equilibrium model (CGE)
12.  We proceed as follows; first we present the main 
modeling aspects, emphasizing strengths and weakness of the analysis, then we present the 





The multiregional model is based upon the GTAPinGAMS
14 framework. This framework 
provides a basic CGE model similar to the Global Trade Analysis Project-GTAP
15 model 
(Hertel, et. al. (1997)). Here we aggregate the GTAP’s different regions into 12 regions 
(including Colombia) that are relevant to the Colombian case observing historical trade 
patterns. The general specification of this model follows earlier studies of trade agreements, 
such as the model of trade policy options for Chile and Brazil (Harrison, Rutherford and 
Tarr, 2002) and the FTAA analysis for Colombia (Rutherford and Light, 2002). The model 
incorporates 57 production sectors and 5 factors of production, although we aggregate them 
to 10 sectors and keep the factor specification. Tables A1 to A7, in the appendix, display 
sectors, factors, regions and the base year data structure of the model for trade, 
consumption and production. 
 
The specification of the model follows the work by Rutherford and Tarr (1999) on the 
Uruguay Round, Chile, and Brazil and Rutherford and Light (2002). We concentrate here 
on the “base” model, which is static and assumes constant returns to scale (CRTS). Apart 
from the fact that imports and exports are distinguished by many regions, the structure of 
                                                 
12  Although , the model was available thanks to the Directorate of Economic Studies at the Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación in Colombia, the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
correspond to those of the Colombian Government. 
13 This section follows closely DNP (2003) and Light (2004)  
14 See the GTAPinGAMS homepage at: http://debreu.colorado.edu/gtap5/ 
15 See http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v5/v5_doco.asp for a detailed description of the data.   31
the model within any country is very close to the basic GTAPinGAMS model. That is, 
production entails the use of intermediate inputs and the primary factors (Labor, Capital 
and Land). Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a region, but are internationally 
immobile. We assume Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions for 
value added, and Leontief production functions for intermediates and the value added 
composite, i.e. we allow for substitution between capital and labor in the production of 
value added, but impose a constant relation between intermediate inputs and value added,  
which imposes a less flexible structure to the economic system. Output is differentiated 




Changes in welfare are measured using the representative agent’s utility. We use the 
equivalent variation measure to combine the effect of simultaneous price and income 
effects. This measure computes the percentage change in income that is equivalent to the 
change in consumption the representative agent can afford in the counterfactual. The 
GTAPinGAMS framework allows us to explicitly evaluate the importance to Colombia of 
improved market access for the United States (and to other regions), as well as potentially 
detrimental trade-diversion effects upon neighboring countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Brazil.  
 
The base year data in both models comes from national accounting data for 1997. In order 
to reconcile several trade agreements signed since 1997, we adjust the model and tariff 
structure to reflect the current trade regimes. Relevant agreements are the Andean Trade 
Pact, where there is a free trade zone within the Andean Community, and MERCOSUR, 
which is a free trade area between Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. In addition to 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact, we also assume that NAFTA operates as an effective 
free trade area with zero tariffs between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but each of the three 
countries has its own external tariff. Although there are many other regional preferential 
trading arrangements in the Americas that are implemented at different levels of 
effectiveness, the GTAP dataset does not incorporate several of these preferential tariff 
                                                 
16 See figure A1 in the appendix.   32
rates. Therefore, we use a combination of tariff rates taken from the GTAP5
17 dataset, as 
well as more recent statistics from the IADB-FTAA trade database
18.  
 
Like any model, this one is a simplification of an economic problem using theoretically 
sound assumptions. These assumptions and simplifications do not invalidate the relevance 
of the results but an account of each of them is important to understand the simulations. We 
list some of the strengths and limitations of using the Multiregional Trade model for 




•  Multiregional framework: This approach has two advantages. First, it explicitly 
accounts for the effects that trade agreements have over all foreign countries. This is 
important because allows to asses changes in the comparative advantage in all 
foreign countries and in this way determine trade-diversion and trade-creation. 
Second, the multiregional framework describes the importance of the agreements to 
other country’s welfare. For example, it is possible to identify key exports for 
Mexico – which will help Colombia to understand the motivation behind some 
policies for key trading partners. The multiregional framework allows us to see the 
strategic complementarities between countries, identifying possible trading partners 
and the effects of trade agreements upon non-participating nations, so that policy 
makers can take into account the effects not only of their own policies, but to also 
account for policies followed by other countries. 
 
•  Consistent and comparable Data: The GTAP dataset and GTAPinGAMS model is a 
consistent and comparable dataset across a large number of countries. That is, the 
GTAP research group is careful to consistently define the nature of each 
commodity. Because sectoral definitions are carefully defined and checked, output 
and consumption can be compared across sectors and countries. 
                                                 
17 For a detailed report that describes how tariff and non-tariff barriers are calculated, see GTAP website. 
18 The true barriers to agricultural imports are much higher than those reported in the GTAP data. See DNP 




•  Representative Agent-RA framework: The model cannot address the distributional 
impacts of the trade agreements because there is only one agent per country. Since 
the representative agent (RA) framework represents welfare for the average citizen, 
poverty and income distribution cannot be addressed. 
 
•  Constant Returns to Scale: With this assumption we are able to analyze goods trade 
liberalization only. However, theoretical work done recently shows that most gains 
are found in services rather than in goods trade. Because this component is not 
captured by the multiregional model, the benefits from technology transfers and 
knowledge that comes with service liberalization will remain completely 
unmeasured.  
 
•  Aggregate Sectoral Definition: The GTAP model distinguishes 57 production 
sectors. While this is a large number of sectors when considering the computability 
of a multi-regional trade model and the difficulties of acquiring the data, it is not 
specific enough for particular industries to use.  
 
•  Potential Exports and Economic Structure: The multiregional trade model does not 
include sectors which were not traded during the base year, 1997. This effectively 
precludes the possibility of future exports from sectors that have a potential 
comparative advantage but that are not currently traded. More generally, the model 
is tied to the base-year data and does not reflect some potentially important 
economic changes. 
 
•  Current Account Balance Constraint: In our static, constant return to scale and 
representative agent framework, the current account balance is held constant during 
the counterfactual experiments. This constraint will introduce some undesired 
changes in the terms of trade for a country. In particular, the elimination of large   34
tariffs in the USA will induce exports of Colombian goods to the USA However 
given the fixed current account balance constraint referenced above, this will 
necessarily be counter balanced by a large and permanent increase in USA imports 
into Colombia. This result is required in order to ensure that the current account 
balance does not change as a result of the agreement.  
 
•  Static framework: In a dynamic sense the expectation would be that the 
liberalization process would trigger secular changes in investment patterns and 
productivity across a range of critical product and service sectors which would 
significantly improve GDP and export growth performance over time and improve 
the external balance situation. This feature is not included into a static model 
because it constitutes borrowing funds from the future without the opportunity cost 
of repayment.  Following the permanent income hypothesis the trade liberalization 
would generate an increase in consumption (besides the augment in investment) 
and, in the short run, a trade deficit (see Kehoe (2003)). 
 
•  Full Employment: Labor supply is fixed, which can overstate the impact of free 




Simulations are performed against a base year data. The Base year refers to the structure of 
the Colombian economy recorded by the 1997’s GTAP data base plus an update of the 
tariff structure between countries that have signed free trade agreements since then. Given 
that the exact tariff level and composition of those new agreements are hard to estimate, we 
use zero tariffs for trade within commercial blocs and most favored nation tariffs for 
commerce outside the blocs whenever the data is not available. However, data for Andean 
countries and USA is completely updated. See the appendix for a complete account of the 
Colombian economy structure reported in GTAP data base and the tariff structure implicit 
in the Andean Community and the preferential treatment of Colombian products by the 
USA after ATPA.    35
 
We used four basic scenarios for the CRTS model: 
 
1.  ATPA: Simulate the Andean Trade Preference Act, i.e. we implement a policy in 
the U.S. that puts a zero tariff on all the goods coming from the Andean countries 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). This experiment allows us to asses the 
possible losses that these countries, particularly Colombia, might have if the ATPA 
is removed in the future. This is not really a counterfactual experiment, given that 
the Act is already in force. But could be helpful in evaluating the accuracy of model 
predictions and the effects of losing the preferences and not signing an agreement 
with the U.S. 
 
2.  BILAT: In this scenario we implement a bilateral free trade agreement between 
Colombia and the U.S. and maintain the ATPA preferences for the rest of the 
Andean countries. Thus, both Colombia and the U.S. eliminate all their tariff and 
non-tariff barriers and export subsidies for trade in goods and services between the 
two countries, while the U.S. allows preferential access to Andean countries. This 
scenario allows us to see the competitive and welfare effects for Colombia in 
contrast to the ATPA scenario, i.e. how much does Colombia gain or lose if the 
ATPA stands in place forever and Colombia signs a free trade agreement with the 
U.S. The quantitative difference between the results from this scenario and the 
ATPA scenario shows how much Colombia might gain or lose if it signs an 
agreement in the current economic context. 
 
3.  USCOL: In this scenario we simulate a bilateral free trade agreement between the 
U.S. and Colombia and eliminate the ATPA preferences for the other Andean 
countries. This experiment is quite similar to the bilat, though it allows us to see the 
competitive gains Colombia might have vis-`a-vis the other Andean countries, once 
the ATPA is eliminated. This is an important scenario because ATPA is not likely 
to stand forever and, the USCOL scenario, allows us to quantify the effects for   36
Colombia from being one of the first countries in signing an agreement with the 
U.S. 
 
4.  FTAA: We simulate the Free Trade Area of the Americas, eliminating all tariff and 
non-tariff barriers within the Americas having ATPA as a starting point. Thus, this 
scenario combines ATPA and multilateral liberalization.  
 
Table 14 shows the scenarios emphasizing the agreements covered by each one.  
 
Table 14 
    ATPA BILAT    USCOL  FTAA 
ATPA   yes yes no  no 
Bilateral Agreement  no yes yes  yes 





Under the scenarios described in the last section, the model’s results show that, although 
small, there is an increase in welfare and production of the Colombian consumers and 




The simulations show ATPA as the best scenario for the Colombian economy (see table 
15). This result seems counterintuitive, because we must expect a bigger improvement in 
welfare and production coming from a more world integrated stance, but can be explained 
by the model’s assumptions about government and trade barriers. Government collects 
taxes from production and consumption and transfers these revenues directly to the 
representative agent as an endowment. Then, although tariff revenues are not important 
                                                 
19 The model allows for different degree of substitution, transformation and import price elasticities. Here we 
are reporting the realistic low elasticity scenario in which the elasticity of imports to domestic production is 2, 
the elasticity of transformation of domestic production to exports is 2 and imports price elasticity is equal to 4. 
Results for high elasticity values can be provided upon request.    37
within the government’s revenue structure, this reduction trim down the consumption 
possibilities for the representative agent. This result comes from the assumption that the 
existence of low tariff barriers between a given trade partners shift the terms of trade in 
favor of the country imposing the barriers. This would imply that Colombia can affect the 
international price of some goods by increasing the supply of the goods that experienced 
the tariff reduction. Additionally, the difference between the bilateral agreement and ATPA 
cannot be taken as the latter being superior to the former. The bilateral agreement would 
make permanent existing preferences, creating stable conditions for local firm’s new 
investment plans. 
 
Table 15 shows the aggregate results of the simulations. Three points must be outlined from 
this table. First, economic integration brings larger welfare and production for the economy 
created by the import goods price reduction and by the expansion of the exports supply. 
Second, the real exchange rate depreciates under all scenarios that imply Colombian tariffs 
elimination. This is in line with the internal consistency of the model and the base year data 
which features a current account deficit of 5% of the GDP. In order to maintain unaffected 
the current account, the expansion in exports must be compensated with an increase in 
imports that create the depreciation. Third, tariff revenues are reduced, affecting the 
government transfers to households. If this effect wants to be avoided new sources of 
revenues have to be created.  
 
Table 15 
Summary Results      
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL   FTAA  
Equivalent Variation    0.79 0.52 0.54 0.28
∆ Production  0.38 0.17 0.17 0.19
∆Tariff Revenues ($M)    55.33 -635.86 -637.54 -1107.57
Real Exchange Rate    -1.21 0.38 0.36 1.8
∆ U.S. Imports    3.4 31.4 31.0 20.3
∆ Exports to U.S.    20.4 27.1 27.9 22.5
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In this type of models sectoral imports, exports and production are driven by the effect of 
the agreement on the relative prices. As can be observed from Table 16 the bilateral 
agreement and the FTAA scenarios generate an important improvement in the terms of 
trade, determined by the reduction in the price of imports after the elimination of trade 
barriers. Comparing this figures with that under ATPA and considering the size differences 
of the trade partners; this result highlights the impact over the cost reduction to consumers.  
 
Table 16 
Change in terms of trade (%)     
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL    FTAA  
 Cereals    0.93 19.69 19.8 22.36
 Oil Seeds    5.08 17.2 17.81 18.02
 Other Ag.    1.6 5.15 5.52 11.03
 Energy and mining    1.3 2.03 2.03 7.62
 Protected Manufactures    1.41 3.02 3.02 8.99
 Food products    2.47 6.04 6.56 12.35
 Textiles and Apparel    4.5 15.46 15.83 18.62
 Other manufacturing    1.45 4.61 4.54 6.65
 Services    0.86 0.33 0.33 -0.05
 
Exports and imports move in the expected direction (see Tables 17 and 18). Although 
production is reduced in some sectors affected by the increased competition, expanding 
sectors are absorbing resources from shrinking activities driven by the change in the 
relative prices (see Tables 19 and 20). As we mentioned above this drastic reallocation of 
resources is difficult to be observed in the available data and trade liberalization 
experiences, but are consistent with the model assumptions. In particular, the model cannot 
capture the smooth adjustment process that will take place after some clauses and 
exemptions are included in the text of the agreement. 
 
Sector by sector results influence the relative remuneration to factors (See table 21).   
Unskilled labor wages increases by a higher proportion that those of skilled workers and 
other factors of production. These results are consistent with the inherent theory of the 
model but not by the facts described in the previous sections. This can be explained by the 
simplistic assumptions about both firm’s competition and labor market structure.   39
 
ATPA vs. BILAT 
 
Even though the advantages of a bilateral agreement are evident, some would be tempted to 
think that it is better to keep renewing tariff preferences and protect the local firms from the 
USA competing imports. We use two arguments against this point. One comes from the 
model results and the other from the Mexican experience.  
 
The simulation results show the bilateral agreement as a superior scenario than ATPA 
because three superior benefits: (i) Terms of trade, (ii) Factors returns and (iii) consumers 
prices. Indeed, terms of trade are higher under BILAT because Colombian exporters face 
higher export prices and lower import prices. Factor returns are higher because a complete 
reallocation of resources is taken place. Finally, as explained above, consumers face lower 
consumption goods prices which are not completely translated in the welfare indicator by 
the loss in government revenue that is completely translated to the consumer’s disposable 
income.  
 
Additionally, from the effects not taken into account in these models, the great advantage of 
signing the agreement lies in the stability of the rules to investment. Indeed, the preferential 
treatment received by the Andean region under ATPA is temporary and subject to 
conditions that have to be renewed constantly. The bilateral agreement will provide security 
to investors, stabilizing their expectations and allowing long term investment in sectors and 
goods that prove to be successful under the new conditions. Although these features cannot 
be captured by this model, it does not mean that the agreement will improve Colombian 
prospects by itself. In effect, macroeconomic stability, trade related infrastructure and 
improvements in the investment environment are necessary to realize the expected gains. 
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Table 17 
Colombian import volume (percentage change)   
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL    FTAA  
 Cereals    6.0  142.1 141.3 120.1
 Oil Seeds    3.1  156.2 153.6 134.2
 Other Ag.    7.2  72.9 71.7 47.4
 Energy and mining    3.7  37.4 37.1 17.5
 Protected Manufactures    2.8  38.6 38.2 19.2
 Food products    6.7  84.2 82.0 57.2
 Textiles and Apparel    5.0  64.3 62.7 41.7
 Other manufacturing    2.9  25.7 25.6 16.5
 Services    4.8  1.9 1.8 -0.8
 
Table 18 
Colombian export volume (percentage change)   
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL    FTAA  
 Cereals    11.0  9.1 9.3 9.2
 Oil Seeds    77.2  81.9 84.6 61.6
 Other Ag.    11.8  13.9 14.4 13.6
 Energy and mining    -4.1  -1.3 -1.2 1.4
 Protected Manufactures    11.1  14.0 14.3 7.8
 Food products    32.4  35.9 37.0 33.7
 Textiles and Apparel    42.5  99.2 99.9 83.3
 Other manufacturing    5.1  7.4 7.8 5.7
 Services    -3.2  -1.2 -1.2 0.7
 
Table 19 
Colombian production (percentage change)     
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL    FTAA  
 Cereals    -0.1 -6.4 -6.4 -7.0
 Oil Seeds    6.4 7.3 7.5 6.2
 Other Ag.    0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.5
 Energy and mining    -2.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.5
 Protected Manufactures    -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.2
 Food products    0.5 0.3 0.3 -0.1
 Textiles and Apparel    2.5 6.4 6.3 8.9
 Other manufacturing    -1.7 -2.4 -2.4 -1.6
 Services    -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
 Ownership of dwellings    0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0  41
Table 20 
Price of Consumer goods (percentage change)    
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL  FTAA  
 Cereals    0.1  -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
 Oil Seeds    -1.6  -2.5 -2.5 -2.1
 Other Ag.    0.6  0.7 0.7 0.5
 Energy and mining    0.0  0.4 0.4 -0.3
 Protected Manufactures    -0.7  -0.7 -0.7 -2.0
 Food products    0.1  0.0 0.0 -0.1
 Textiles and Apparel    -0.8  -2.8 -2.8 -3.3
 Other manufacturing    -0.6  -1.1 -1.1 -1.3
 Services    0.2  0.7 0.8 1.0
 Ownership of dwellings    0.5  1.1 1.1 1.4
 
Table 21 
Return to factors in Colombia (Percentage Change) 
    ATPA    BILAT    USCOL    FTAA  
 SKL-LABOR    0.0  0.6  0.6 1.0
 UNSKL LABOR    0.6  1.2  1.2 1.6
 CAPITAL    0.3  0.8  0.8 1.1
 CAP-PROF    0.9  1.7  1.7 2.1
 N-RES    -3.0  -0.7  -0.8 0.7  42
VI. Conclusions 
 
After assessing the effects of past trade liberalization reforms and evaluating the possible 
outcome a free trade agreement between Colombia and USA the following conclusions 
arise:  
 
1.  Although the past reforms had an effect on the share of international trade, such an 
effect has been relatively small compared with Chile and Mexico.  
2.  Given that the major part of the trade liberalization has been done, the effects of a FTA 
between Colombia and USA are likely to be relatively small. 
3.  The effect of a free trade agreement between Colombia and United States will be 
positive for the Colombian economy as a whole.  
4.  To guarantee that the benefits derived from such an agreement can spread to different 
geographical regions and different economic sectors, the Colombian government must 
undertake several measures:   (i) integrate all the regions of the country in economic 
unity. This implies the construction and improvement of transportation infrastructure; 
(ii) increase the share of skilled workers in labor supply. This implies better efficiency 
and more government spending on education.  
5.  It must be clear what kind of productive structure is beneficial for the Colombian 
society. In particular, since the agreement can affect negatively part of the agricultural 
sector, it must be clear if the government should or should not negotiate special clauses 
for it. In order to answer this question, a detailed study on the agricultural sector is 
necessary, evaluating its efficiency, demand for labor and importance for the economy 
as a whole.   43
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Appendix 
 
1.  Regions, sectors and factors  
T a b l e   A 1         Table A2 
Regions in the Multiregional Trade Model   
 col    Colombia   
 ven    Venezuela   
 xap
20  Rest of Andean Pact  
 xsm   Rest of South America   
 bra    Brazil   
 msr    Mercosur Countries except Brazil   
 Mex   Mexico   
 cm    Central America and Caribbean   
 can    Canada   
 usa    United States of America   
 eur    European Union 15   
 row    Rest of World          
  
Table A3 
Model Sectors          
PDR  Paddy rice                                  VOL  Vegetable oils and fats  OME  Machinery and equipment nec 
WHT Wheat  MIL  Dairy products  OMF  Manufactures nec 
GRO Cereal grains nec  PCR  Processed rice  ELY  Electricity 
V_F  Vegetables - fruit - nuts  SGR  Sugar  GDT  Gas manufacture - distribution 
OSD  Oil seeds  OFD  Food products nec  WTR  Water 
C_B  Sugar cane - sugar beet  B_T  Beverages and tobacco products  CNS  Construction 
PFB Plant-based  fibers  TEX  Textiles  TRD  Trade 
OCR  Crops nec  WAP  Wearing apparel  OTP  Transport nec 
CTL  Bo horses  LEA  Leather products  WTP  Water transport 
OAP  Animal products nec  LUM  Wood products  ATP  Air transport 
RMK Raw milk  PPP  Paper products - publishing  CMN  Communication 
WOL Wool - silk-worm cocoons  P_C  Petroleum - coal products  OFI  Financial services nec 
FRS  Forestry  CRP  Chemical - rubber - plastic products  ISR  Insurance 
FSH  Fishing  NMM Mineral products nec  OBS  Business services nec 
COL  Coal  I_S  Ferrous metals  ROS  Recreational and other services 
OIL  Oil  NFM  Metals nec  OSG  Public admin - and defence - education - health 
GAS  Gas  FMP  Metal products  DWE  Ownership of dwellings 
OMN Minerals nec  MVH Motor vehicles and parts  CGD  Savings good /;                                 
CMT Bo meat products  OTN  Transport equipment nec    




                                                 
20 Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia 
Factors of Production 
 lnd    Land   
 skl    Skilled labor   
 lab    Unskilled labor   
 capres   Capital Natural resources     46
2.  Data structure at the base year (GTAP 1997) 
Table A4 
Imports Tariff Structure for Colombia and Major Trading Partners 
21     
Trade From:     usa    colombia    xsm    eur    xsm    col  
 To:     col    usa97    usa02    usa    col    col    eur  
 Sugar    18.0 53.0 53.0 53.0 18.0 0.0 76.0
 Milk products    19.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 19.0 19.0 88.0
 Other Crops    9.0 22.0 3.0 22.0 9.0 9.0 3.0
 Oil seeds    11.0 18.0 0.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Wearing apparel    20.0 15.0 3.0 13.2 20.0 18.4 13.0
 Textiles    16.0 12.0 6.0 16.0 16.8 20.0 11.0
 Other Food products    18.0 11.0 0.0 11.0 18.0 18.0 29.0
 Leather Products    13.0 6.0 0.0 5.7 16.3 10.0 5.0
 Chemical, rubber, plastic    8.0 5.0 0.0 2.0 7.0 12.0 7.0
 Vegetables and Fruits    14.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 14.0 14.0 15.0
 Natural Gas and Minerals    5.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0
 Metal products    14.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 13.8 14.8 4.0
 Other Machinery    9.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 8.4 14.0 2.0
 Electronic equipment    6.0 2.0 0.0 1.8 6.6 6.0 4.5
 Petroleum Products    10.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 9.3 9.0 0.2
 Other Transport Equipment    3.0 2.0 0.0 0.9 3.7 20.0 1.0
 Other Mineral product    14.0 2.0 0.0 6.0 15.0 14.0 7.0
 Major Crops    14.7 2.0 0.0 1.7 17.6 17.1 18.2
 Heavy Industry    13.8 1.5 0.0 0.9 10.5 5.8 0.1
 Bo Meats    16.4 1.5 0.0 2.0 13.2 10.8 46.8
 Wood, Paper, Publishing    13.6 1.2 0.0 1.3 11.6 10.5 1.5
 Cereal Grains    12.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 12.0 12.0 39.0
 Motor vehicles, parts    15.0 1.0 0.0 1.2 23.4 30.0 4.1
 Finance and Other Services    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Communication    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Savings Good    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Dwelling Ownership    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Coal    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Oil    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Transportation: All Modes    0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0
 Services: Public and Private    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
                                                 
21 usa97: United States as reported in 1997 data, usa02: United States tariffs reported in IADB/FTAA 
database for 2001, plus textile exemptions, eur: European Union 15, xsm: Other South American Countries   47
Table A5 
Structure of Export Sectors for Colombia
22          
    X-U.S.   X     %-X   LAB/VA  SKL/VA   CAP/VA   RES/VA 
 Oil    1641.3 2143.5 53.7 10.2 2.1 48.1 39.6
 Other Crops    980.0 2802.9 82.0 46.5 0.6 25.1 27.8
 Transportation: All Modes    383.0 1851.7 16.7 71.1 13.5 15.3  0.0
 Wearing apparel    305.5 495.9 18.7 53.5 7.7 38.8  0.0
 Finance and Other Services    206.4 1462.1 10.8 28.5 22.8 48.7  0.0
 Heavy Industry    189.8 515.9 10.5 29.2 7.7 63.1  0.0
 Other Food products    179.9 576.8 9.9 33.5 7.2 59.2  0.0
 Petroleum Products    177.5 339.2 14.8 57.2 10.4 32.3  0.0
 Vegetables and Fruits    152.5 480.7 14.6 46.5 0.6 25.1 27.8
 Chemical, rubber, plastic    118.6 1210.6 15.0 33.4 7.8 58.9  0.0
 Services: Public and Private    111.5 512.3 0.9 41.4 28.4 30.2  0.0
 Coal    98.2 902.5 90.1 15.4 1.3 41.7 41.6
 Other Mineral product    50.7 198.8 10.9 41.0 6.7 52.3  0.0
 Leather Products    44.6 146.5 14.4 42.8 6.2 51.0  0.0
 Textiles    42.5 310.0 14.8 45.5 6.8 47.7  0.0
 Sugar    39.2 254.1 17.1 37.2 8.0 54.8  0.0
 Wood, Paper, Publishing    33.3 288.4 6.9 43.7 7.5 48.8  0.0
 Metal products    13.0 123.6 10.3 46.1 8.1 45.8  0.0
 Other Machinery    12.6 387.6 15.9 49.7 12.2 38.0  0.0
 Bo Meats    11.8 47.4 0.4 49.0 2.4 26.6 22.1
 Major Crops    11.3 92.8 1.3 41.5 3.0 42.6 12.8
 Motor vehicles, parts    3.2 118.9 7.7 59.8 11.9 28.3  0.0
 Electronic equipment    2.3 14.8 3.5 52.0 12.4 35.6  0.0
 Communication    0.9 10.3 0.4 21.5 17.2 61.3  0.0
 Other Transport Equipment    0.9 15.9 5.4 60.5 11.3 28.2  0.0
 Milk products    0.5 8.2 0.4 35.6 5.2 59.2  0.0
 Cereal Grains    0.1 1.0 0.3 46.6 0.5 25.1 27.8
 Natural Gas and Minerals    0.1 5.9 0.8 47.9 7.0 30.6 14.6
 Oil seeds    0.0 1.1 0.4 46.6 0.5 25.1 27.8
 
                                                 
22 X-US: Colombian export value to the United States. X: Total Colombian Exports by Sector. %-
X:Percentage  of Colombian production that is sold as exports. (Exports/(Exports+Domestic). LAB/VA: 
Unskilled labor’s value share in total value-added. SKL/VA: Skilled labor’s value share in total value-added. 
CAP/VA: Capital value share in total value-added. RES/VA: Natural resource value share in total value-
added.   48
Table A6 
U.S. Imports and the Colombian Share          
    %M   M from COL     Total M   %-COL     TM-COL
23 
 Oil    52.1 1641.3 55396.5 3.0 0.0 
 Other Crops    34.6 980.0 6925.0 14.2 22.0 
 Transportation: All Modes    11.7 383.0 60470.6 0.6 0.0 
 Wearing apparel    37.7 305.5 36967.7 0.8 15.0 
 Finance and Other Services    1.6 206.4 43308.6 0.5 0.0 
 Heavy Industry    15.4 189.8 75766.4 0.3 1.5 
 Other Food products    7.1 179.9 14423.0 1.2 11.0 
 Petroleum Products    5.2 177.5 7853.9 2.3 2.0 
 Vegetables and Fruits    17.2 152.5 5000.2 3.1 5.0 
 Chemical, rubber, plastic    12.6 118.6 66076.6 0.2 5.0 
 Services: Public and Private    0.8 111.5 42316.5 0.3 0.0 
 Coal    1.2 98.2 294.5 33.3 0.0 
 Other Mineral product    15.2 50.7 12825.9 0.4 2.0 
 Leather Products    71.4 44.6 19893.5 0.2 6.0 
 Textiles    19.0 42.5 19611.3 0.2 12.0 
 Sugar    24.0 39.2 1220.3 3.2 53.0 
 Wood, Paper, Publishing    8.8 33.3 41645.2 0.1 1.2 
 Metal products    7.8 13.0 16407.3 0.1 3.0 
 Other Machinery    24.7 12.6 147719.3 0.0 3.0 
 Bo Meats    2.7 11.8 5567.0 0.2 1.5 
 Major Crops    7.0 11.3 10628.4 0.1 2.0 
 Motor vehicles, parts    26.9 3.2 109116.5 0.0 1.0 
 Electronic equipment    46.2 2.3 151114.4 0.0 2.0 
 Communication    2.9 0.9 8912.3 0.0 0.0 
 Other Transport Equipment    14.1 0.9 17662.3 0.0 2.0 
 Milk products    2.5 0.5 1206.6 0.0 42.0 
 Cereal Grains    1.6 0.1 548.5 0.0 1.0 
 Natural Gas and Minerals    28.1 0.1 9878.3 0.0 4.0 
 Oil seeds    4.8 0.0 477.8 0.0 18.0 
 
                                                 
23 USA Tariffs to Colombian products using 1997’s GTAP data. Some tariffs may be lower after ATPA   49
Table A7 
Colombian Consumption (Millions of U.S. Dollars)      
    %    Production + Imports    %M  %M from U.S.  TM-U.S
24.  
 Services: Public and Private    31.8 55125.0 1.6 27.9 0.0 
 Finance and Other Services    7.9 13737.3 11.7 14.3 0.0 
 Bo Meats    6.5 11337.8 1.0 44.6 16.4 
 Transportation: All Modes    5.9 10262.5 10.3 21.7 0.4 
 Chemical, rubber, plastic    5.9 10190.7 30.1 38.2 8.0 
 Dwelling Ownership    5.6 9778.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Major Crops    4.8 8276.3 10.6 28.4 14.7 
 Other Food products    3.4 5855.2 7.0 11.9 18.0 
 Heavy Industry    3.3 5749.1 20.8 15.8 13.8 
 Other Machinery    3.3 5720.1 63.0 43.6 9.0 
 Wood, Paper, Publishing    2.7 4757.2 13.9 30.9 13.6 
 Vegetables and Fruits    2.2 3764.4 5.2 11.0 14.0 
 Motor vehicles, parts    1.9 3231.9 54.5 14.5 15.0 
 Communication    1.4 2442.1 0.8 19.0 0.0 
 Textiles    1.4 2428.5 23.3 25.2 16.0 
 Wearing apparel    1.4 2402.8 7.0 67.2 20.0 
 Milk products    1.3 2321.3 3.8 15.3 19.0 
 Petroleum Products    1.3 2291.1 10.6 14.6 10.0 
 Other Mineral product    1.3 2216.0 16.8 26.0 14.0 
 Oil    1.2 1998.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Electronic equipment    1.1 1865.9 78.0 57.1 6.0 
 Metal products    0.9 1504.9 24.5 34.1 14.0 
 Sugar    0.8 1346.8 0.4 4.1 18.0 
 Leather Products    0.6 1001.2 9.3 9.8 13.0 
 Other Transport Equipment    0.5 871.8 68.2 44.1 3.0 
 Natural Gas and Minerals    0.4 750.9 6.3 18.0 5.0 
 Other Crops    0.4 699.7 6.0 16.3 9.0 
 Cereal Grains    0.4 681.3 48.7 67.4 12.0 
 Oil seeds    0.2 411.0 20.8 55.6 11.0 
 Coal    0.1 121.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
                                                 
24 Colombian Tariffs to U.S. products using 1997’s GTAP data. Some tariffs may be lower after ATPA. A0: 
total consumption (Domestic production + Imports). %M: consumption imported. %M-U.S: Consumption 
imported from U.S. 
   50































5 . 0 = σ
Intermediate 1 Interm. j
0 = σ






Good 1 Good 2 Good j
1 = σ
Domestic Imported Domestic Imported Imported Domestic
Region 1 Region k Region 1 Region k Region 1 Region k ... ... ...
2 dm σ = 2 dm σ = 2 dm σ =
4 mm σ = 4 mm σ = 4 mm σ =